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Abstract—We extend the equivalence between network coding
and index coding by Effros, El Rouayheb, and Langberg to the
secure communication setting in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Specifically, we show that the most general versions of secure
network-coding setup by Chan and Grant and the secure index-
coding setup by Dau, Skachek, and Chee, which also include the
randomised encoding setting, are equivalent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, equivalence results in information theory and
network coding have been of significant interest in the commu-
nity. Such reduction results uniquely map one communication
problem to another equivalent problem that is potentially easier
to study than the original problem. Some of the equivalence
results already established include those between instances
of multiple-unicast network coding and those of (a) multiple-
multicast network coding [1], (b) secure network coding [2],
and (c) index coding [3].
In particular, the latter result addresses the equivalence
between network coding [4] and index coding [5] in the non-
secure setting. Non-secure network coding and index coding
were shown to be equivalent [3, 6] in the sense that a network-
coding instance can be mapped to an equivalent index-coding
instance, for which a code for one instance can be translated to
the other, and vice versa. Similarly, an index-coding instance
can be mapped to an equivalent network-coding instance, with
a suitable code translation.
While strongly-secure and weakly-secure network coding [7,
9] as well as strongly-secure and weakly-secure index cod-
ing [10] have been studied in the literature so far, an equiva-
lence between these coding approaches for the secure setting
has not been addressed to the best of our knowledge.
Note that the equivalence between non-secure network and
index coding does not trivially apply to the secure setting. In
particular, we pointed out [11] that equating the eavesdropper
settings in secure network coding and secure index coding
is not straightforward. We also showed that the equivalence
breaks down in the randomised encoding setting—noting that
randomised encoding is inevitable in some secure network-
coding instances [7].
In this paper, we extend the equivalence between network
and index coding by Effros, El Rouayheb, and Langberg [3]
to strongly-secure and weakly-secure settings, by proposing
a suitable mapping for the eavesdroppers. For the mapping
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from secure network coding to secure index coding, we also
introduce the concept of an augmented secure network-coding
instance to capture the randomness in the encoding. With this,
we incidentally establish an equivalence between non-secure
network and index coding with randomised encoding.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND NOTATION
For any positive integer n, let [n] , {1, . . . , n}. For a set
I = {i1, . . . , i|I|}, let XI , [Xi1 · · ·Xi|I| ] with an arbitrary
but fixed order. The tail and head of an edge (u, v) ∈ E
in a directed graph G = (V,E) refer to vertices u, and v,
respectively, i.e., u = tail(e) and v = head(e). For a node
v ∈ V , we let in(v) to be the set of all edges with head(e) = v;
similarly, out(v) denotes the set of all edges with tail(e) = v.
A. Secure network coding
1) Network-coding instances: We follow Chan and Grant’s
secure network-coding definition [12]. It includes Bhattad and
Narayanan’s weakly-secure network-coding definition [9] and
Cai and Yeung’s strongly-secure network coding definition [7]
as special cases. A secure network-coding instance, denoted
by I = (G,M,W ), is defined as follows:
• G = (V , E) is an acyclic graph with vertex set V and
edge set E . Each edge e ∈ E has a capacity given by ce.
• M = (S, O,D) is the connection requirement. The set
S is the collection of source-message indices, where the
source messages {Xs : s ∈ S} are mutually independent
and are each distributed on [2Rsn], for some positive
integer n that can be chosen to suit the design of network
codes. Here, Rs denotes the rate of the message Xs,
s ∈ S. The source-location mapping O : S → V specifies
the originating nodeO(s) for the source messageXs. The
destination-location mapping D : S → 2V specifies the
nodes D(s) that require the message Xs.
• W = ((Ar ,Br) : r ∈ R) defines the eavesdropping
pattern for |R| eavesdroppers. Each eavesdropper r ∈ R
observes the set of links Br ⊆ E and tries to reconstruct
a subset of source messages indexed by Ar ⊆ S, i.e.,
XAr .
We assume that vertices with no incoming links are origi-
nating nodes for some source messages, and vertices with no
outgoing links are destinations for some source messages.
2) Deterministic network codes: Given (G,M), a network
code (F ,G) consists of a collection of encoding functions for
the edges F = {fe : e ∈ E}, and decoding functions for the
vertices G = {gu : u ∈ V} satisfying the following:
The local encoding function fe for edge e takes in random
variables associated with in(tail(e)) and source messages origi-
nating at node tail(e), and outputs a random variable associated
with link e, denoted by Xe ∈ [2
cen].
Given that G is acyclic, each edge message Xe can be
written as a function of source messages originating from its
predecessors, denoted by f¯e. This is known as the global en-
coding function, and it can be recursively calculated (following
the topology of the graph) using (i) f¯e = fe if tail(e) has
no incoming links, and (ii) f¯e = fe(f¯e1 , f¯e2 , . . . , f¯en), where
{e1, e2, . . . , en} = in(tail(e)).
The decoding function gu for a node u ∈ V takes in random
variables associated with links in(u) and source messages
originating at node u, and outputs X{s∈S:u∈D(s)}. In this
paper, we only consider zero-error decoding.
3) Randomised network codes: A network code is said to
be randomised if there exists an edge function fe that is not a
deterministic function of the random variables associated with
in(tail(e)) and source messages originating at node tail(e).
Any randomised function can be implemented by generating
an independent random variable Zu at each node u ∈ V , where
Zu takes values in an alphabet with size
∏
e∈out(u) 2
cen, where
out(u) is defined as the set of all outgoing edges from node
u. These independent random variables are often referred to
as random keys.
A randomised network code (F ′,G) is similar to a deter-
ministic network code (F ,G), except that each edge encoding
function f ′e is a function of (i) random variables associated
with in(tail(e)), (ii) source messages originating at node tail(e),
and (iii) the random key Ztail(e).
4) Secure network codes: A deterministic or randomised
network code (F ,G) for (G,M) is said to be secure against
an eavesdropping pattern W if each eavesdropper r gains no
information about XAr that it attempts to reconstruct after
observing XBr on the links it has access to, i.e.,
H(XAr |XBr) = H(XAr ), r ∈ R. (1)
In other words, (F ,G) is a secure network code for the secure
network-coding instance I .
5) Secure network-coding rates: The secure network-
coding instance is said to be (RS , n)-feasible if and only
if there exists at least one secure network code with the
associated source-message rates and block size n.
B. Secure index coding
1) Secure index-coding instances: We follow
Dau, Skachek, and Chee’s secure index-coding
definition [10]. A secure index-coding instance, denoted
by Iˆ = (Sˆ, Tˆ , {Wˆtˆ}, {Hˆtˆ}, Wˆ ), is defined as follows:
• Sˆ = [k] is the set of indices of k source messages
available at a sender. The messages {Xˆsˆ : sˆ ∈ Sˆ} are
mutually independent and for sˆ ∈ Sˆ , Xˆsˆ is distributed
on [2Rˆsˆn], for some non-negative message rate Rˆsˆ and
positive integer n that can be chosen to suit the design
of index codes.
• Tˆ = [ℓ] is the collection of ℓ receiver indices.
• Wˆtˆ is the set of the indices of the messages required by
receiver tˆ ∈ Tˆ .
• Hˆtˆ is the set of indices of the messages known a priori
to receiver tˆ ∈ Tˆ .
• Wˆ = ((Aˆrˆ , Bˆrˆ) : rˆ ∈ Rˆ) is the eavesdropping pattern.
Each eavesdropper rˆ ∈ Rˆ has access to the codeword
broadcast by the sender and a subset of the messages
XBˆrˆ
, and tries to reconstruct XAˆrˆ , where Aˆrˆ, Bˆrˆ ⊆ Sˆ.
2) Deterministic index codes: A deterministic index code
(Fˆ , Gˆ) = (fˆ , {gˆtˆ : tˆ ∈ Tˆ }) consists of an encoding function
by the sender Fˆ = fˆ which takes in the random variables
XˆSˆ and outputs a random variable Xˆb ∈ [2
cˆbn], where cˆb is
the broadcast rate, and n is the block size of the code. It also
consists of a decoding function gˆtˆ for receiver tˆ, which takes
in the sender’s codeword Xˆb and its prior messages XˆHˆtˆ
and
outputs the messages XˆWˆtˆ
it requires. Similar to the network-
coding setup, we only consider zero-error decoding.
3) Randomised index codes: A randomised index code
(Fˆ ′, Gˆ) is defined similar to the deterministic index codes
except that the sender’s encoding function takes in an inde-
pendent random key Zˆ ∈ [2rˆbn] of some positive rate rˆb in
addition to XˆSˆ . Unlike the model by Mojahedian, Aref, and
Gohari [8], the randomness allowed in the encoding in our
setting is known only to the sender, and is not shared between
the sender and the receivers.
4) Secure index codes: A deterministic or randomised index
code (Fˆ , Gˆ) is said to be secure against the eavesdropping
pattern Wˆ if no eavesdropper rˆ gains no information about
the message set XˆAˆrˆ it tries to reconstruct by observing the
sender’s codeword Xˆb and its side information XˆBˆrˆ , i.e.,
H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb, XˆBˆrˆ) = H(XˆAˆrˆ ), rˆ ∈ Rˆ. (2)
Clearly, Aˆrˆ ∩ Bˆrˆ = ∅. Specifically, we say that (Fˆ , Gˆ) is a
secure index code for the secure index-coding instance Iˆ .
5) Secure index-coding rate: The secure index-coding in-
stance is said to be (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible if and only if there
exists at least one secure index code with the associated source-
message rates RˆSˆ , broadcast rate cˆb, and block size n.
III. MAPPING FROM SECURE INDEX CODING TO
SECURE NETWORK CODING
Given an instance Iˆ = (Sˆ, Tˆ , {Wˆtˆ}, {Hˆtˆ}, Wˆ ) of a se-
cure index-coding problem, where Sˆ = [k] and Tˆ = [ℓ],
we construct an equivalent secure network-coding instance
I = (G,M,W ) using the following rule:
Index-to-network coding mapping:
• The graph G = (V , E) consists of k + ℓ + 2 vertices
labelled as V = {s1, s2, . . . , sk, t1, t2, . . . , tℓ, 1, 2}. For
each i ∈ Sˆ, vertex si has an outgoing link to vertex 1
and to each vertex in {tj : i ∈ Hˆj}. Each of these links
from vertex si are of capacity 2
Rˆin. Vertex 1 has a link
of capacity 2cˆbn to vertex 2 and to each vertex in {ti :
i ∈ Tˆ }.
• The connection requirement M consists of the following:
S = Sˆ , and XS has the same distribution as XˆSˆ , which
implies Ri = Rˆi. For each message Xi, i ∈ S, the source
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(a) A secure index-coding instance Iˆ , where an eavesdropper rˆ
has access to the broadcast message Xˆb, side information Xˆ4,
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(b) A secure network-coding instance I , where an eavesdrop-
per r has access to link (1, 2), all outgoing links from node s4,
and tries to reconstruct X2. The capacity of all links given by
thick arrows is cˆb
Fig. 1: A secure index-coding instance Iˆ and its corresponding secure network-coding instance I
locations are O(i) = si, i.e., the message Xi originates
at vertex si, and is destined for D(i) = {tj : i ∈ Wˆj}.
• The eavesdropping patternW is defined as R = Rˆ, Br =
{(1 → 2), {out(si) : i ∈ Bˆr}}, and Ar = Aˆr.
Note that by construction, for each i ∈ Tˆ ,
• Wˆi = {j ∈ S : ti ∈ D(j)}.
• Hˆi = {j ∈ S : (sj → ti) ∈ E}.
• The vertices in V \ {t1, . . . , tℓ} are not the destinations
of any source message.
Figure 1 depicts an example of such a mapping. With the
above conversion, we now state an equivalence between these
two instances:
Theorem 1: Let Iˆ and cˆb be a secure index-coding instance
and a broadcast rate, respectively. Let I be the corresponding
secure network-coding instance using the index-to-network
coding mapping. For any RˆSˆ and cˆb, the instance Iˆ is
(RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible if and only if I is (RS , n)-feasible.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Iˆ is (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible ⇒ I is (RS , n)-feasible:
Let (Fˆ , Gˆ) be a secure index code that supports (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n).
Then,
H(XˆWˆtˆ
|Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆ
) = 0, for all tˆ ∈ Tˆ , (3)
H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb, XˆBˆrˆ) = H(XˆAˆrˆ ), for all rˆ ∈ Rˆ, (4)
where Xˆb = fˆ(XˆSˆ , Zˆ), where Zˆ ∈ [2
cˆbn] is a random key in-
dependent of the source messages (to account for randomised
index coding), and
XˆWˆtˆ
= gˆtˆ(fˆ(XˆSˆ , Zˆ), XˆHˆtˆ
), for all tˆ ∈ Tˆ . (5)
Now, we construct a secure network code as follows:
• Set fe = Xtail(e) for each outgoing edge e from each
vertex in {si : i ∈ Sˆ}. This is possible since vertex si is
the originating vertex for the message Xi.
• Set f(1,2) = fe = fˆ(XS , Z1) ∈ [2
cˆbn] for all e ∈ out(2),
where Z1 is independent of all the source messages XS
and has the same distribution as Zˆ.
• Set gti = gˆi for all i ∈ Tˆ , and gu = 0 for all other
vertices.
For each vertex ti, i ∈ Tˆ , all incoming edges in(ti) originate
from vertex 2 and vertices {sj : j ∈ Hˆi}. The message on edge
(2, ti) is fˆ(XS , Z1), and that on edge (sj , ti) is f(sj ,ti) = Xsj .
This means vertex ti, i ∈ Tˆ , can decode
gti(fˆ(XS , Z1),XHˆi) = gˆi(fˆ(XS , Z1),XHˆi) (6a)
= XWˆi = X{j∈S:ti∈D(j)}. (6b)
Here, (6b) follows from (5) as Zˆ and Z1 have the same
distribution and both are independent of the respective sources
messages. Noting that the rest of the vertices are not the
destination for any source message, the network code satisfies
the decoding requirements of I .
Each eavesdropper r ∈ R = Rˆ has access to messages on
the edge set Br consisting of
• edge (1, 2), which carries fˆ(XS , Z), and
• edges {out(si) : i ∈ Bˆr}, which carry messages XBˆr .
Now,
H(XAr |XBr) = H(XAˆr |fˆ(XS , Z),XBˆr) (7a)
= H(XAˆr ) = H(XAr ), (7b)
where (7b) follows from (4) with a change of variables (from
non-hatted to hatted).
This completes the proof that the network code is also
secure against all the eavesdroppers described by W .
I is (RS , n)-feasible ⇒ Iˆ is (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible:
Let {F ,G} be a secure network code that supports (RS , n).
Then,
H(X{s∈S:u∈D(s)}|Xin(u), XO−1(u)) = 0, u ∈ V , (8)
and
H(XAr |XBr) = H(XAr |{fe : e ∈ Br})
= H(XAr), r ∈ R. (9)
By the construction of I , we know that {s ∈ S : u ∈ D(s)} =
∅, for any u ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sk, 1, 2}, and {s ∈ S : ti ∈
D(s)} = Wˆi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}. Also, none of the vertices in
{t1, t2, . . . , tℓ} is the originating node for any source message.
So, (8) becomes
H(XWˆi |Xin(ti)) = H(XWˆi |X(2,ti), Xl1 , . . . , XlL) = 0,
(10)
for i ∈ [ℓ], where in(ti) = {(2, ti), l1, l2, . . . , lL}, L = |Hˆi|
and
X(2,ti) = f2→ti(f¯(2,ti)(XS ,Z), Z2) (11)
X{l1,...,lL} = [f(sh1 ,ti)(Xh1 , Zsh1 ),
. . . , f(shL ,ti)(XhL , ZshL )], (12)
where Hˆi = {h1, . . . , hL}, Z is the collection of all {Zi}
generated by nodes {1, s1, . . . , s|S|}, and Z2 is independent
of all messages and Z.
Decoding at all ti’s must succeed for any realisation of {Zj}.
Hence, (10) must also hold when all Zsj = 0. This gives
H(XWˆi |X
′
(2,ti)
, X ′l1 , . . . , X
′
lL
) = 0, (13)
where
X ′(2,ti) = f(2,ti)(f¯(1,2)(XS , Z1), Z2), (14)
X
′
{ℓ1,...,ℓL}
= [f(sh1 ,ti)(Xh1 , 0), . . . , f(shL ,ti)(XhL , 0)],
(15)
by setting Zsi = 0 for all vertices si, i = 1, . . . , k.
Now, we construct a secure index code as follows:
Xˆb = fˆ(XˆSˆ , Zˆ) = f¯(1,2)(XˆSˆ , Zˆ), (16)
where Zˆ ∈ [2cˆbn] is a random variable independent of the
messages, and having the same distribution as Z1.
Now, for each receiver tˆ ∈ Tˆ ,
H(XˆWˆtˆ
|Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆ
)
= H(XˆWˆtˆ
|Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆ
, f(sh1 ,ttˆ)(Xˆh1 , 0), . . . , f(shL ,ttˆ)(XˆhL , 0))
= H(XˆWˆtˆ
|Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆ
, f(sh1 ,ttˆ)(Xˆh1 , 0), . . . , f(shL ,ttˆ)(XˆhL , 0),
f(2,ttˆ)(Xˆb, Zˆ2)) (17a)
≤ H(XˆWˆtˆ
|f(sh1 ,ttˆ)(Xˆh1 , 0), . . . , f(shL ,ttˆ)(XˆhL , 0),
f(2,ttˆ)(Xˆb, Zˆ2))
= 0, (17b)
where (17b) follows from (13) with a change of variables
(from hatted to non-hatted), and (17a) follows from the fol-
lowing Markov chains
XˆWˆtˆ
− (Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆ
, fsh1→ttˆ(Xˆh1 , 0), . . . , fshL→ttˆ(XˆhL , 0))
− f2→ttˆ(Xˆb, Zˆ2), (18)
as Zˆ2 is independent of all other random variables, and has
the same distribution as Z2.
Since conditional entropy is non-negative, it follows from
(17b) that each receiver tˆ ∈ Tˆ can decode the messages XˆWˆtˆ
that it requires, given (Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆ
).
We now prove the security constraints in Iˆ . First, consider I .
If Xi is requested by some nodes, then observing all outgoing
links from si must enable one to reconstruct Xi. If Xj is not
requested by any node, we assume that observing all outgoing
links from sj also enables one to reconstructXj . The rationale
behind this assumption is as follows: If Rj = R
′ is in the
feasible region, then all Rj > R
′ are also in the feasible
region by having node sj transmitting the first nR
′ bits of
Xj . Hence, we only need to consider the smallest feasible
rate for Xj , denoted by Rmin, when all the other rates are
kept fixed. Now, if after observing all outgoing links from sj ,
one can obtain only nR′′j bits of information of Xj (where
R′′j < Rmin), then node sj could have transmitted Xj at rate
R′′j , which contradicts that Rmin is the smallest feasible rate
for Xj .
So, from (9), we have
H(XAr) = H(XAr |{Xe : e ∈ Br}) (19a)
= H(XAr |f¯(1,2)(XS , Z1),X{out(si):i∈Bˆr}) (19b)
= H(XAr |f¯(1,2)(XS , Z1),X{out(si):i∈Bˆr},XBˆr)
(19c)
≤ H(XAr |f¯(1,2)(XS , Z1),XBˆr) (19d)
≤ H(XAr ), (19e)
where (19c) is derived because observing all outgoing links
from si allows one to reconstruct Xi. Thus, it follows that
(19d) and (19e) must hold with equality.
Now, consider an eavesdropper rˆ ∈ Rˆ in the index-coding
equivalence Iˆ .
H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb, XˆBˆrˆ) = H(XˆAˆrˆ |f¯(1,2)(XˆSˆ , Zˆ), XˆBˆrˆ)
= H(XˆArˆ ) = H(XˆAˆrˆ), (20a)
where (20a) follows from (19a)–(19e) with a change of vari-
ables (from non-hatted to hatted), by noting that (XˆSˆ , Zˆ) and
(XS , Z1) have the same distribution.
So, Xˆb is a secure index code for Iˆ .
IV. MAPPING FROM SECURE NETWORK CODING TO
SECURE INDEX CODING
Given a secure network-coding instance I = (G,M,W ),
we first construct an augmented secure network-
coding instance with deterministic encoding, and then
construct an equivalent secure index-coding instance
Iˆ = (Sˆ, Tˆ , {Wˆtˆ}, {Hˆtˆ}, Wˆ ).
Augmented secure network coding: We construct an aug-
mented secure network-coding instance I ′ = (G′,M ′,W ′) as
follows:
• G′ = (V ′, E ′) = G = (V , E), and c′e = ce for all e ∈ E
′.
The vertices, the edges, and the edge capacities remain
the same.
• Let S = [S], where S , |S|. The connection requirement
is augmented as follows: S ′ = S ∪{S+1, S+2, . . . , S+
|V ′|}, where we introduce an additional source X ′S+v ∈
[
∏
e∈out(v) 2
cen] , [2kvn], originating at each vertex v ∈
[|V ′|], that takes the role of and has the same distribution
as the random key Zv used in the randomised encoding at
vertex v in I . So, O′(S+v) = v, i.e., X ′S+v originates at
vertex v, and we define D′(S+ v) = ∅, i.e., X ′S+v is not
requested by any vertex. For s ∈ S, X ′S has the same
distribution as XS , O
′(s) = O(s), and D′(s) = D(s).
Note that R′s = Rs for all s ∈ [S], and R
′
S+v = kv for
all v ∈ [|V ′|].
• W ′ = W , i.e., R′ = R, B′r = Br, and A
′
r = Ar.
The adversarial setting remains the same. Thus, messages
{X ′S+v : v ∈ [|V
′]} are neither known to the adversaries
nor need to be protected.
Any deterministic or randomised (i.e., using an independent
random key Zv at vertex v) secure network code for I is
equivalent to a deterministic secure network code for I ′, where
each node v gets an additional source X ′S+v that is not
required to be decoded by any node.
Denote the set of vertices in I ′ that are destinations for some
source messages by T ′ = {j ∈ V ′ : j ∈ D′(i) for some i ∈
S ′}. Note that O′(·) can map different source indices to one
vertex, and hence, O′−1(j) returns a set of indices of messages
originating at vertex j.
Network-to-index coding mapping:
• Sˆ = S ′ ∪ E ′. It consists of one source message Xˆs for
each s ∈ S ′ in I ′, and one Xˆe for each edge e ∈ E ′ in
I ′. XˆS′ has the same distribution as X
′
S′ . The rates of
the messages are Rˆs = R
′
s and Rˆe = c
′
e.
• Tˆ = {tˆi}i∈T ′ ∪ {tˆe}e∈E′ . This means Iˆ has |T ′| + |E ′|
receivers, one for each destination node in I ′ and one for
each edge in I ′.
• For each tˆe ∈ Tˆ , Hˆtˆe = in(tail(e)) ∪ O
′−1(tail(e)), and
Wˆtˆe = {e}.
• For each tˆi ∈ Tˆ , Hˆtˆi = in(i)∪O
′−1(i), and Wˆtˆi = {s ∈
[S] : i ∈ D′(s)}.
• The eavesdropper setting W ′: Rˆ = R′. For each rˆ ∈ Rˆ,
Bˆrˆ = B′rˆ, and Aˆrˆ = A
′
rˆ.
• We set the broadcast rate as cˆb =
∑
e∈E′ c
′
e.
Figure 2 depicts an example of such a mapping.
Remark 1: This network-to-index coding mapping is slightly
different from that of Effros et al. [3], since we do not require
the use of an additional receiver tˆall for the corresponding
index-coding instance. We will show that omitting this receiver
will not affect the equivalence.
Note that unlike the index-to-network mapping, here XˆE′
and X ′E′ have different distributions, where the latter are
functions of X ′S′ . For the corresponding secure index-coding
instance, we choose {Xˆe : e ∈ E ′} to be mutually independent,
independent of all other messages, and each Xˆe is uniformly
distributed over [2Rˆen]. We will see that using uniformly
distributed Xˆe is the key to ensuring security.
With the above conversion, we now state an equivalence
between I and Iˆ through I ′:
Theorem 2: Let I be a secure network-coding instance and
I ′ be its augmented instance. Let Iˆ and cˆb be the corresponding
secure index-coding instance and a broadcast rate, respectively,
obtained using the network-to-index coding mapping from I ′.
For any RS , the instance I is (RS , n)-feasible if and only if
the instance Iˆ is (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible.
Proof of Theorem 2:
I is (RS , n)-feasible ⇒ Iˆ is (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible:
Note that I is (RS , n)-feasible if and only if I
′ is (R′S′ , n)-
feasible using deterministic network encoding functions {f ′e}
derived from {fe} for I , where all the randomness {Zv} in
the network code for I is realised using {XS+v} in I ′.
Since the network code for I ′ is deterministic, we use the
same code mapping as that proposed by Effros et al. [3]: The
sender’s broadcast message is Xˆb = [Xˆb(e)]e∈E′ , where
Xˆb(e) = Xˆe + f¯
′
e(XˆS′). (21)
Note that Xˆe, f¯
′
e ∈ [2
Rˆen] = [2c
′
en] = [2cen].
In I ′, each vertex v ∈ T ′ can decode all messages that it
requires from the message on all incoming edges and messages
originating at v, meaning that
X
′
{s∈S′:v∈D′(s)} = X
′
{s∈[S]:v∈D′(s)} = g
′
v(X
′
in(v)∪O′−1(v))
= g′v(X
′
in(v),X
′
O′−1(v))
= g′v([f¯
′
e(X
′
S′)]e∈in(v)),X
′
O′−1(v)).
As mentioned above, while messages X ′
O′−1(v) and
XˆO′−1(v) (with node subscripts) have the same distribution,
messagesX ′
in(v) and Xˆin(v) (with edge subscripts) may not. To
deal with this issue, consider the broadcast message Xˆb. From
(21), any receiver that knows Xˆe can obtain f¯
′
e(XˆS′), where
[f¯ ′e(XˆS′)]e∈E′ and [f¯
′
e(X
′
S′)]e∈E′ have the same distribution.
So, with a change of variables (from non-hatted to hatted),
receiver tˆi ∈ Tˆ can decode the messages it requires using
XˆWˆtˆi
= Xˆ{s∈[S]:i∈D′(s)} = g
′
i([f¯
′
e(XˆS′)]e∈in(i)), XˆO′−1(i)).
As receiver tˆi knows Hˆtˆi = in(i) ∪ O
′−1(i) by the mapping,
it knows XˆO′−1(i) and can obtain [f¯
′
e(XˆS′)]e∈in(i)) from Xˆb
and Xˆin(i).
Receiver tˆe ∈ Tˆ uses (21) to obtain the required Xˆe
from Xˆb(e) − f¯ ′e(XˆS′), where the first term is the broadcast
message available to the receiver tˆe. To obtain the second term,
express the global encoding function as its local encoding
function, f¯ ′e(XˆS′) = f
′
e([f¯
′
e′(XˆS′)]e′∈in(tail(e)), XˆO′−1(tail(e))),
where XˆO′−1(tail(e)) is available to receiver tˆe as side infor-
mation. From the broadcast message, receiver tˆe can obtain
f¯ ′e′(XˆS′) = Xˆb(e
′) − Xˆe′ , as it has Xˆe′ , e
′ ∈ in(tail(e)), as
side information. With this, we have shown that each tˆ ∈ Tˆ
can decode the messages that it requires.
We now consider the security constraints. For each rˆ ∈ Rˆ,
H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb, XˆBˆrˆ) (22a)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{Xˆb(e) : e ∈ E
′}, {Xˆe′ : e
′ ∈ Bˆrˆ}) (22b)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{Xˆb(e) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ}, {Xˆe′ : e
′ ∈ Bˆrˆ}) (22c)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{Xˆb(e), Xˆe′ , f¯
′
e(XˆS′) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ}) (22d)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{f¯
′
e(XˆS′) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ}) (22e)
= H(XˆA′
rˆ
|{f¯ ′e(XˆS′) : e ∈ B
′
rˆ}) (22f)
= H(XˆA′
rˆ
) = H(XˆAˆrˆ ), (22g)
where (22c) follows from the Markov chain
XˆAˆrˆ
−
(
{Xˆb(e) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ}, {Xˆe′ : e
′ ∈ Bˆrˆ}
)
− ({Xˆb(e) : e /∈ Bˆrˆ}),
where {Xˆb(e) : e /∈ Bˆrˆ} has been randomised by indepen-
dently and uniformly distributed {Xˆe : e /∈ Bˆrˆ}, which are
independent of (XˆAˆrˆ , XˆBˆrˆ , XˆS′) (see (21)); (22d) follows
1X1
2
fe2(X1, Z1)fe1(X1, Z1)
r1 r2
X1 X1 X1
(a) I with randomised
encoding
1
X ′1, X
′
2
2
f ′e2(X
′
1, X
′
2)f
′
e1
(X ′1, X
′
2)
r′1 r
′
2
X ′1 X
′
1 X
′
1
(b) I ′ with deterministic
encoding
Sender
Xˆ1, Xˆ2, Xˆe1 , Xˆe2
Xˆb
tˆ2Xˆe1 , Xˆe2tˆe2Xˆ1, Xˆ2 Xˆe1 rˆ1 Xˆe2 rˆ2
Xˆe2 Xˆ1 Xˆ1 Xˆ1
tˆe1Xˆ1, Xˆ2
Xˆe1
(c) Iˆ with deterministic encoding
Fig. 2: A secure network-coding instance I , its augmented version I ′, and the corresponding secure index-coding instance Iˆ ,
where r1, r2, r
′
1, r
′
2, rˆ1, rˆ2 are eavesdroppers
from (21); (22e) follows from the Markov chain
XˆAˆrˆ
− {f¯ ′e(XˆS′) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ} − {Xˆe′ , Xˆb(e) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ},
which can be derived from (21) and noting that {Xˆe : e ∈ E ′}
are independent of (XˆAˆrˆ , XˆBˆrˆ , XˆS′); and (22g) follows from
(1) by a change of variables (from hatted to non-hatted) and
noting that {f¯ ′e(X
′
S′) : e ∈ B
′
rˆ} = X
′
B′
rˆ
So, the index code is secure.
Iˆ is (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible ⇒ I is (RS , n)-feasible:
We will show that if Iˆ is (RˆSˆ , cˆb, n)-feasible, then I
′ is
(R′S′ , n)-feasible, which implies that I is (RS , n)-feasible.
Again, we use the network-code construction proposed by
Effros et al. [3]. Note that for a secure index code, there exists
a decoding function at receiver tˆi for each i ∈ T ′, such that
gˆtˆi(Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆi
) = gˆtˆi(Xˆb, Xˆin(i)∪O′−1(i)) (23a)
= XˆWˆtˆi
= Xˆ{s∈[S]:i∈D′(s)}, (23b)
and a decoding function at receiver tˆe, e ∈ E ′, such that
gˆtˆe(Xˆb, XˆHˆtˆe
) = gˆtˆe(Xˆb, Xˆin(tail(e))∪O′−1(tail(e))) (24a)
= XˆWˆtˆe
= Xˆe. (24b)
In the secure index-coding instance Iˆ , messages XˆE′ are
independent of messages XˆS′ , and the broadcast message
Xˆb is a function of these messages. However, given Xˆb, the
messages XˆE′ and XˆS′ are dependent.
We set Xˆb = σ (which is an arbitrary but valid realisation
of Xˆb in the network code) for all gˆtˆi(·) and gˆtˆe(·), and choose
X ′e = g
′
e(X
′
in(tail(e))∪O′−1(tail(e))) (25)
= gˆtˆe(σ,X
′
in(tail(e))∪O′−1(tail(e))), (26)
for all edges e ∈ E ′, and
g′i(X
′
in(i)∪O′−1(i)) = gˆtˆi(σ,X
′
in(i)∪O′−1(i)), (27)
for each destination vertex i ∈ T ′. By fixing the first argument
in the functions to be σ, X ′E′ are now functions of the
source messages X ′S′ , and they can be generated following
the (acyclic) graph topology of I ′. Now, (23a)–(24b) hold for
any realisation of the variables XˆS′∪E′ . So, for any realisation
of the messages x′S′ , using (26) with the chosen σ, and
following the topology of G′, we can generate the correct and
unique realisation of x′e for every edge e. This will ensure
that the decoding step (27) for each destination i ∈ T ′ gives
the correct x′{s∈[S]:i∈D′(s)}. Thus, correct decoding can be
achieved without using the additional receiver tˆall proposed
by Effros et al. [3].
Finally, consider the security constraints of I ′. Security for
the index code implies that
H(XˆAˆrˆ ) = H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb, XˆBˆrˆ) ≤ H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb) ≤ H(XˆAˆrˆ ),
which implies that XˆAˆrˆ and XˆBˆrˆ are independent given Xˆb.
In particular, they are independent given Xˆb = σ. As XˆS′ and
X
′
S′ have the same distribution, in the event that Xˆb = σ, we
see from (23a)–(27) that p(x′S′ ,x
′
E′) = p(xˆS′ , xˆE′ |xˆb = σ).
Since
I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb = σ) = 0 = I(XˆAr ; XˆBr |Xˆb = σ), (28)
we have I(X ′Ar ;X
′
Br
) = 0, which gives the required security
constraint (1) for I ′.
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